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The global financial crisis triggered by fallout from the sub-prime mortgage
market in the U.S. has led economists to focus attention on the role of monetary policy in
the crisis. The question of how monetary policy affects the financial sector is the key to
the current debate over the role financial stability should play in the monetary policy
decisions. As a contribution to this debate, my dissertation examines the link between
monetary policy and three main financial sectors - the banking sector, the stock market,
and the housing market.
The first essay examines whether the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
responded to changes in equity prices during the period 1966-2009. I distinguish the
indirect response, where the FOMC reacts to equity prices only when equity prices affect
its target variables, from the direct response, where the FOMC reacts to equity prices
directly regardless of their effects on the target variables. In addition, the paper models
the Federal Reserve's reaction function as state dependent, hypothesizing that the FOMC
may respond to changes in asset prices asymmetrically during different states of the
economy. The results show that the FOMC did respond directly to equity price changes
when asset prices were falling. During non-bust periods, the FOMC did not respond
directly to equity prices. It used information on equity prices to forecast target variables.

The second essay investigates the effect of expansionary and contractionary
monetary policy on the risk taking behavior of low-capital and high-capital banks. Using
quarterly data on federally insured banks spanning the period from 1991 to 2010, the
paper shows that expansionary policy caused high capital banks to take more risk.
Capital constrained banks were not significantly affected by expansionary monetary
policy. Contractionary monetary policy, however, is not effective in affecting the risktaking behavior of both capital-constrained and unconstrained banks.

The paper,

therefore, confirms the hypothesis that expansionary policy is more effective in
encouraging capital unconstrained banks to invest more in risky assets.
The third essay examines the role of monetary policy on housing bubbles in the
last three decades. A spatial dynamic model is used to explicitly account for spatial
cross-section dependence in the data. Using quarterly panel data on 48 contiguous U.S.
states and District of Columbia, the paper discovers that the housing bubbles across the
U.S. are mainly driven by the local or state specific factors during the period 1976 2000. However, the prolonged low interest rate since the 2001 recession contributed to
the run-up in house prices across states.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The financial crisis that began in the summer of 2007 was the most severe since
the Great Depression. The immediate cause was a downturn in the national housing
market that followed a long period of rapid construction and rising home prices (Mishkin,
2009). These developments have created hardship for the families who are forced to
leave their homes and have disrupted communities. It has also contributed to a major
shock to the financial system, with sharp increases in credit spreads and large losses to
financial institutions.
The Federal Reserve System (the Fed) was obligated to take a number of steps to
contain the crisis as the subprime market disruption spread to other asset-backed
securities and across the financial system. The Fed lowered the federal funds rate target
from 51/4% in September 2007 to 1/4% in December 2008. Despite the substantial
decline in the federal funds rate and interest rates on Treasury securities, the cost of credit
to both households and businesses has generally risen. Since then interest rates on riskier
debt instruments have risen sharply. Banks and other financial intermediaries have also
sharply tightened credit standards for both household and business.
However, some researchers and financial commentators have linked stock market
and housing price bubbles to excess liquidity in the financial system and excessive easy
monetary policy (Taylor, 2009, Adrian and Shin, 2008). Opponent of this view have
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taken the position that monetary policy was neither a principal cause of the asset price
bubble nor the appropriate device for controlling the bubble in the financial markets
(Mishkin, 2009, Bernanke, 2010).

As a contribution to this ongoing debate, this

dissertation explored the link between monetary policy and three major financial sectors
- stock markets, banking sector and the housing market.
The first essay focused on addressing the question: What has been the response
of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) to movements in equity prices? In the
previous studies there is no consensus whether the FOMC has adopted an unannounced
policy goal of responding to the change in equity prices, or the FOMC consider stock
price movements only to the extent that they impact on the primary monetary policy
goals of price stability and output growth. The essay distinguishes the FOMC's reaction
to forecasts of traditional goal variables, which may depend on equity prices, from the
FOMC's independent reaction to changes in equity prices.

In addition, previous

empirical studies implicitly assume that the response of FOMC to changes in equity
prices is symmetric. Evidenced from different historical episodes, the Fed could respond
differently depending on the state of the economy. The essay, thus, model the monetary
policy reaction function as state dependent, to disentangle the asymmetric response of the
Fed during the bust and non-bust periods.
A real-time data and Greenbook forecasts (GBF) or Survey of Professional
Forecasts (SPF) of the target variables, either as regressors or as instruments, are used for
the period 1966-2009. The regression results indicated that the FOMC did respond
directly when the economy was in the state of asset bust. During the non-bust periods,
the Fed was not responding to the change in equity prices. However, the Fed used the
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stock market information in forecasting its policy targets regardless of the state of the
economy.
The second essay contributes to the recent debate how monetary policy easing
encourages banks to take excess risk. Most of the debates so far have focused on how
low interest rate induced greater risk-taking through a search for yield (Rajan, 2005) or
its effect on leverage (Bario and Zhu, 2008). But there could be an opposite risk-shifting
effect when the banks operate with limited capital or excess liability. Furthermore, the
empirical studies so far fail to distinguish the effects of contractionary and expansionary
monetary policy on banks risk taking. It is unclear whether contractionary, expansionary
policy or both drive banks risk-taking.

This essay addresses these limitations by

exploring the asymmetric response of capital-constrained and capital-unconstrained
banks to the two monetary policy instances, i.e. expansionary and contractionary
monetary policy. The response of well-capitalized banks to the change in monetary
policy could be different from response of poorly-capitalized banks.
Using quarterly data on federally insured banks for the period 1991-2010, the
result from the symmetric model indicated a positive link between federal funds rate and
banks risk-taking. That means banks take more risk as the federal funds rate increases,
and banks discourage to take more risk as interest rate falls.

However, this positive

linkage disappeared when the policy is disaggregated into expansionary and
contractionary policy. In addition, the policy-asymmetric responses disappeared as the
sample is divided into high capital and low capital banks. Well-capitalized banks
responded more strongly to expansionary policy, while the poorly capitalized banks were
not responding at all. The result also shows that contractionary policy didn't have any
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significant effect on the risk-taking behavior of all banks independent of the level of
capitalization.
The current financial turmoil, triggered by increasing defaults in the subprime
mortgage market, has reignited the debate about the effect of monetary policy on boombust cycle of housing prices. The third essay examined the role of monetary policy on
the boom and bust cycles of housing prices. Taylor (2007) showed that the exceptionally
low short-term interest rate during the period 2003-2004 substantially contributed to the
boom in the housing starts. It also led to an upward spiral of higher house price, falling
delinquency and foreclosure rates, more favorable credit ratings and financing conditions,
and higher demand for housing. As the short-term interest rates returned to normal
levels, housing demand fell rapidly, bringing down both construction and house price
inflation. A number of researchers and policy makers have been opposing Taylor's
(2007) view, including the current chairman of the Fed, Ben Bernanke and the former
chairman, Alan Greenspan.
The above two opposing views were implicitly assume that the response of
housing markets across the regions are the same.

This is in fact based on the

conventional view that monetary policy cannot be used to influence, control or target the
economic conditions of particular regions. However, regional economic conditions can
significantly influence the aggregate response to monetary policy actions (Carlino and
Defina, 1999). The housing market across the states in east-coast, in the middle and
west-coast are not only very heterogeneous but also interdependent across the
neighboring states. I incorporated the three important factors - national, state or regional
and spatial - in the analysis of the role of monetary policy on the housing boom-bust
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cycle. Using quarterly panel data on 48 contiguous U.S. states and District of Columbia,
the essay identified that how the change in the federal funds rate affected the growth in
housing prices across the states. The results indicate that the housing bubble in the last
three decades was mainly driven by the local or state specific factors, and the change in
monetary policy didn't have any significant effect. However, the recent housing boom
was different in a sense that expansionary monetary policy had contributed to the run-up
in the housing prices across the states.
In summary, these three essays concentrate on the dynamic relationship between
the financial markets or institutions, and monetary policy. The first essay indicated that
monetary authorities indeed had been taking into account the movement in equity prices
after the bubble burst. The last two essays focused on the role of monetary policy on
financial distress. Monetary policy easing had a significant impact on encouraging wellcapitalized banks to take more risk.

While the poorly capitalized banks were not

significantly affected by the expansionary monetary policy. It is also found that the
extended expansionary monetary policy since 2001 recession had a significant
contribution on housing market boom, which subsequently burst after 2006.
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CHAPTER II

HOW DID THE FEDERAL RESERVE RESPOND TO STOCK MARKETS?

2.1. Introduction

During the past two to three decades, the Federal Reserve has been largely
successful at keeping inflation under control (Bernanke and Gertler, 2001). Although it
is too early to say that inflation is no longer an issue of concern, it is quite plausible that
the next battle facing the central bank is on a different front. The increase in financial
instability, of which one important dimension is increased volatility of asset prices, has
already been a concern of policy makers and researchers. In fact, there are obvious
historical episodes that warrant such concern. For instance, the 1990 recession in the
United States has been attributed to the preceding decline in real estate prices (Bernanke
and Lown, 1991). Even the more recent rapid rise and subsequent decline in residential
housing prices and stock prices have contributed to a major shock to the financial system.
It leads to a sharp increase in credit spreads and large losses to financial institutions
(Taylor, 2007). With these episodes in mind, it is normal for one to ask how the policy
makers, i.e., the central bankers, respond to asset price variability.
A number of debates have been made on the appropriate role of equity prices on
monetary policy deliberation. Two general arguments are considered in these debates.
The first argument is that the central banks should not be independently concerned with
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what is happening in the asset market; rather, the asset price variability provides
information for predicting the main policy targets. The second argument is that the
volatility in asset price could have a considerable impact on consumption and investment,
and could affect the financial stability of the economy. Hence, central banks should be
concerned about the asset market movement and thus respond to stock price variability.
Most of these debates, however, revolved around policy prescriptions rather than policy
actions. It is more important to understand the policy actions already undertaken for the
future policy prescription. Using historical data this paper examines whether the central
bank targets asset prices in addition to its inflation and output stabilization objective. It
also examines whether asset prices only provide an informative role for monetary policy,
by providing signals about expected inflation or output gap.
A recent study of this type was conducted by Fuhrer and Tootell (2008), who
distinguish the Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) reaction to forecasts of
traditional monetary policy goals, which may depend on equity prices, from the FOMC's
independent reaction to changes in equity prices. They implicitly assume that the FOMC
responds symmetrically when the economy is in different states (i.e., boom/bust). As
Bordo and Jeanne (2002) pointed out, the response of the monetary authorities to asset
price variability might be different depending on the state of the economy. During the
boom period, the domestic private sector accumulates high levels of debt on the
expectation of further rises in asset prices, while the assets themselves serve as collateral.
During the asset market bust, the decline in the value of the collateral induces consumers
to cut back expenditure. It also induces firms to reduce investment spending. The
reduction in spending might lead to additional negative effects on asset prices, which may
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further lead to financial instability. Yet the financial instability could build up in the
environment of stable prices (Borio and Lowe, 2002). Thus to minimize the risk of
financial instability, monetary authorities could consider the asset price as part of their
target, independent of inflation and output gap.
The main objective of this paper is, therefore, to identify whether monetary policy
has an independent concern for the movement in asset prices in different states of the
economy (i.e., asset boom/bust). In addition, the paper addresses two important issues
that are ignored by Fuhrer and Tootell (2008). First, the paper uses the real-time data set
rather than the revised data. The revised data do not reflect the information available to
the monetary authorities and they are, therefore, a poor guide to understand the
authorities' behavior (Orphanides, 2001). Thus, it is logical to evaluate monetary policy
using information available to the monetary authorities at the time of the policy decision.
Second, the paper addresses the existence of a weak instrument problem in the
Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation used by Fuhrer and Tootell (2008).
By using the data for the period 1966-2009, this paper concludes that the Fed
lowered the interest rate in response to decreases in asset prices when the economy was
in an asset bust period. The Fed did not respond independently to the stock market in
non-bust periods. This implies that the Fed was responding directly to stock market
movement after the asset bubble reversal occurred, i.e., after the bubble burst. The Fed,
however, used stock price as an indicator in forecasting the other targets, regardless of the
state of the economy.

These results are robust to alternative specifications and

measurements of the variables used for estimation.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes the
literature explaining the relationship between asset price variability and monetary policy.
In Section 2.3, the paper reviewed the standard framework of forward-looking interest
rate (or Taylor) rules, including a discussion of the use of real-time data and the weak
instrument problems. The asymmetric monetary policy reaction function is also specified
in Section 2.3. Finally, the conclusion is made in Section 2.4.

2.2.

Literature Review

The study of the role of asset prices in monetary policy has essentially led to an
extension of the literature on monetary policy rules. Since Taylor (1993), monetary
policy has been modeled as interest rate feedback rules whereby the Fed changes its
policy instrument in response to variables in the economy, in particular, inflation and
output variability. Taylor (1993) argues that his simple rule is a good representation of
how the Fed sets its policy instrument. However, critics have shown that the so-called
Taylor rule misses the inertial behavior of the interest rates. Moreover, a large volume of
work on optimal policy rules as opposed to simple policy rules have been developed (for
example, Clarida et al. 1999, 2000 and Woodford, 2001). Among the class of optimal
policy rules, there is a division about how these rules are specified, especially when it
comes to the possibility of the Fed's reaction to asset price movements.
A monetary policy response to asset price developments can take two forms:
either proactive, or reactive (Bordo and Jeanne, 2002). A reactive approach is consistent
with an inflation targeting policy regime focusing on price stability. According to this
9

approach, the monetary authorities should wait and see whether the asset price reversal
occurs. If it does occur, they should react to the extent that there are implications for
inflation and output stability. This view is justified by Bernanke and Gertler (2000,
2001) who argued that it is desirable for central banks to focus on underlying inflationary
pressures. Asset price becomes relevant only to the extent that it signals potential
inflationary or deflationary forces. They concluded that as long as the monetary policy
responds aggressively to inflation, there is no rationale for a direct response to asset
prices. They also argued that trying to stabilize asset prices is problematic because it is
nearly impossible to know for sure whether a given change in asset values results from
fundamental factors, non-fundamental factors, or both.
Cecchetti et al. (2000), on the other hand, argued in favor of a more proactive
response of monetary policy to asset prices. They claimed that asset price bubbles create
distortions in investment and consumption, leading to extreme rises and subsequent
declines in both output and inflation. Raising interest rates modestly as asset prices rise
above what are estimated to be warranted levels would reduce the risk of asset reversal.
Similarly, lowering interest rates modestly when asset prices fall below warranted levels
helps to smooth these fluctuations by reducing the possibility of an asset price bubble
forming, thus reduce the risk of boom-bust investment cycles.
The above proactive and reactive debate, which identifies how the Fed should
systematically respond to asset price movements, has revolved more around analysis of
policy prescriptions, rather than realized monetary policy actions. It is important to
understand the policy actions already undertaken for the future policy prescriptions. A
very limited number of studies use historical data identifying how the central banks
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responded to asset price misalignments. Examples of such studies are Rigobon and Sack
(2003), Chadha et al. (2004), and Fuhrer and Tootell (2008). Rigobon and Sack (2003)
used an identification technique based on the heteroskedasticity of stock market returns to
identify the reaction of the Fed to the stock markets.

Their results indicated that

monetary policy reacted significantly to stock market movements. Chadha et al. (2004)
also examine whether asset prices and exchange rates are included in a standard interest
rate rule using data for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan since 1979.
Their results indicated that monetary policy makers respond independently to stock price
misalignment and exchange rate variability. Their results also support the notion that in
addition to the direct effect, both asset prices and exchange rates are used as information
for setting interest rates.
Similarly, Fuhrer and Tootell (2008) distinguished the FOMC's reaction to
forecasts of traditional goal variables (i.e., inflation and output gap), which may depend
on equity prices, from the FOMC's independent reaction to changes in equity prices. By
using the actual forward-looking variables examined by the FOMC (i.e., the "Greenbook
forecasts"), they found little evidence to support the proposition that the FOMC responds
independently to stock values. Rather, the FOMC uses stock price change for forecasting
the usual monetary policy goal variables.
Fuhrer and Tootell (2008), however, implicitly assume that the FOMC responds
symmetrically when the economy is in different states (i.e., boom/bust). They analyzed
the response of monetary policy for the two sub-samples, Pre-Greenspan and Greenspan
periods. Such a sample split, however, does not capture the state-dependent effects,
which could vary within subsamples. The response of the monetary authorities to asset
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price variability might be different depending on the underlying state of the economy.
There is growing literature demonstrating that the effect of a liquidity shock on the
economy, in particular for asset prices, is greater during asset price booms and busts in
comparison to normal times. For example, Borio and Lowe (2002), Bordo and Jeanne
(2002), and Detken and Smets (2004), among others, provide explanations that justify a
tighter link between liquidity measures and asset prices during boom or bust periods.
During boom periods, rising asset prices strengthen banks' balance sheets, and as a result,
banks' leverage falls. When banks target a certain leverage ratio, they want to increase
their liabilities by borrowing more to buy new assets. These thereby lead to further an
asset price rise, which will reignite the whole process. The exact same mechanisms will
work in a comparable manner during bust periods. In such a situation the monetary
authorities might intervene to stop the risk of a boom-bust cycle.
In summary, not only are there divergent views about whether monetary policy
reacts to asset prices, but there is also another dimension to the problem - whether the
reaction, if any, was symmetric in different states of the economy.

A number of

historical episodes (for example the 1987 and 1990 stock market crashes) for which the
Fed was moving aggressively by reducing the short-term interest rate, motivated me to
tackle these issues.

2.3.

Monetary Policy Reaction Function

In this section I briefly review the standard framework analysis of forwardlooking interest rate (or Taylor) rules, augmented by the stock price changes. This policy
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rule allows for asset price to act as both information variables and monetary policy
targets. The paper then discusses the state-dependent effects of asset price on monetary
policy instrument. The main empirical results are reported under each sub-section.

2.3.1. Stock Market Augmented Taylor Rule
Following Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (CGG) (1998, 1999, and 2000), the
following form of augmented forward-looking reaction function is specified as:
L > r + OEtXt+k

2.1

where i* is the targeted nominal interest rate. X t+k is the vector of targeting variables,
i.e., inflation (7t t ), output gap ( y t ) , and real GDP growth (Ay t ). r is, by construction,
the desired nominal rate when both inflation and output are at their target levels.

<D

contain parameter estimates of inflation , output gap, and real GDP growth.
The Taylor rule can also be estimated with a specification which allows for the
possibility that the interest rate adjusts gradually to achieve its target level (Woodford,
1999). Following CGG, the actual observable interest rate /, is assumed to partially
adjust to the target as follows:
it = (1 - p)i^ + p i t _ ! + s t

2.2

where p e (0,1) captures the degree of interest rate smoothing.

e t is an exogenous

random shock and assumed to be i.i.d. Combining the partial adjustment, equation 2.2,
with the target model (2.1) yields the policy reaction function as:
i t = ot + * F E t X t + k + pi t _! + s t

2.3
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where a = (1 - p)f and *F = (1 - p)0>. This equation provides estimates of the
coefficients on target variables and speed of adjustment (p ).
The equity price augmented type of monetary policy rule is specified (Fuhrer and
Tootell, 2008) as:
i t = cc + * F E t X t + k + yS t _! + pi t _j + s t ,

2.4

where St is the asset price at periods To estimate this policy equation, we should
substitute the unobserved (expected) target variables with realized values as follows:
i t = cx + ' F X t + k + y S t _ 1 + p i t _ 1 + u t ,

25

Where the error term, ut = -*P[Xt+k -E t X t + k ] + e t , is a linear combination of the forecast
error of inflation, output and the exogenous disturbances £t.
The forecast of the variables, E t X t+k , in equation 2.4 follow the process:
X t + k = © I t + A.St_! + \xt,

2.6

where I, is the information set used to forecast the policy variables . The main question
addressed at this point is whether stock prices affect the federal funds rate directly, so that
y^O in equation 2.5; or indirectly, i.e., are used for forming forecasts of the variables
Xt+k in equation 2.6, so that X * 0.
Quarterly data from 1966:Q1 to 2009:Q1 are used. Following Fuhrer and Tootell
(2008), the start of the sample is chosen because prior to this time the federal funds rate
was not the effective policy instrument. The inflation rate (7tt) is measured as the annual
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percentage change in GDP deflator.1 The output gap (y t ) is measured by the difference
between real GDP and potential output, which is estimated by the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO). The real GDP growth (Ay ( ) is measured as the annual percentage change
in real GDP. The Federal Funds rate is the nominal interest rate, obtainable from the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The percentage change in the S&P
500 price index is used as a measure of stock price, which are obtained from the EconStat
data base.
The Greenbook forecasts (GBF) and the Survey of professional forecasts (SPF) of
the target variables are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The
Greenbook forecasts are prepared by the Fed staff and presented before each meeting of
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). The FOMC meets every six weeks and
hence there are roughly 8 Greenbook forecasts available in a year. However, for the
earlier part of the sample (i.e., 1966-1970), the FOMC meetings took place almost every
month. Therefore there are twelve forecasts available within a year for that time period.
For the period that Greenbook forecasts are made every six weeks, I use the forecasts
closest to the middle of the quarter. For the early part of the sample when twelve
Greenbook forecasts are available, I also choose the quarterly forecasts that were made in
the second month of the quarter. The Greenbook forecasts are made available to the
public with a five year delay, and hence my sample ends in the last quarter of 2003.
The median surveys of professional forecasts (SPFs) are also used as a proxy for
the private sectors expectation about the future of the economy. This survey was
1

For robustness I also use the PCE chain-weight price index and consumer price index
(CPI). The conclusions are not changed.
2
For robustness the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) index and the NASDAQ
composite price index are also used. The conclusions are not changed.
15

originally conducted by the American Statistical Association/National Bureau of
Economic Research and has been taken over by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia. The SPFs are performed near the end of the second month of each quarter.
The SPF data span from the last quarter of 1968 to the last quarter of 2009.
Panel A of Table 2.1 presents parameter estimates of the baseline model (equation
2.4) for the full sample.3 The first column provides the Instrumental Variable (IV)
estimates of the target variables when the Greenbook forecasts of the targets are used as
instruments.4 These instruments include Greenbook forecasts of inflation, unemployment
rate, and real GDP growth. Due to data limitation on Greenbook forecast of output gap,
unemployment rate is used as alternative to output gap as of Fuhrer and Tootell (2008).
Four lags of stock price changes are also included as instruments. The second column
presents the IV estimates of the targets when SPFs are used as instruments, as alternative
to the Greenbook forecasts. The results indicate that estimates of y 's are not statistically
different from zero at a 5% level of significance. This indicates that the Fed did not
respond directly to the stock price changes.

In line with the literature, the other

traditional targets, i.e., inflation and output gap (measured by unemployment rate) are
found to be positive and significant. The conclusion here is consistent with Fuhrer and
Tootell's (2008) conclusion that the Fed did not directly target stock prices.
However, this paper addresses two related issues that are overlooked by Fuhrer
and Tootell (2008). First, the paper deals with the existence of weak instrument problem
in the IV estimation of the forward-looking policy reaction function. In fact, Fuhrer and
3 The results reported in Table 2.1 employ one period ahead forecasting horizon
(i.e. k =1). The results do not vary for the horizon k =2, 3 and 4.
4
Due to the Orthogonality between regressors and the error term, the Instrumental
Variable (IV) method of estimation is used.
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Tootell (2008) partially disentangle "observational equivalent" or "weak identification"
problem using FOMC forecasts as a more direct measure of information that enters the
FOMC's policy decision.
As indicated in the first and second column, Panel A of Table 2.1, the Hansen's Jtest doesn't indicate rejection of the overidentifying restriction. However, the validity of
instruments not only depends on the exogeneity, but also on the "relevance" or the
weakness of the instruments (Stock et al., 2002). The instruments are said to be "weakly
identified" if the endogenous variables are weakly correlated with the instruments. When
the instruments are weakly identified, the IV estimates, hypothesis tests, and confidence
intervals are unreliable (Staiger and Stock, 1997, Andrews and Stock, 2005). The CraggDonald F-statistic is used to test the weakness of the instruments. Stock and Yogo (2005)
proposed the F-statistic form of the Cragg and Donald (1993) statistic based on the null
hypothesis: the instruments are weak. As reported in the first and second column of
Panel A, I fail to reject the hypothesis at a 5% level of significance. Thus the inference
drawn from these IV estimates suffered from a "weak identification" problem and, hence,
is unreliable.
The second issue addressed in this paper is the use of real-time data rather than
the revised data set that is used by Fuhrer and Tootell (2008). Most of these datasets are
changing over time because of data revisions. For example, data on the real GDP
reported at the first quarter of 2009 would be revised over the next couple of quarters.
This data revision could come from the existence of measurement error or the availability
of new information (Orphanides, 2001). Data revisions for inflation and the output gap
both create differences between the data available to researchers and the data available to
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policymakers. These differences are mainly caused by definitional changes and the data
revisions themselves (Molodtsova et al., 2008). Another distinction is that real-time data
are available to the policymakers, while not available to the public. Thus, this data
incorporate information available to the FOMC at the time of policy decisions.
This paper uses the real-time data that are compiled by Croushore and Stark at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (Croushore and Stark, 2001). These data sets have
a triangular format with the vintage date on the vertical axis and dates on the horizontal
axis. The term vintage denotes each date for which data is available as it appeared at the
time. Because inflation and real GDP are not contemporaneously available, vintage dates
are paired with the last available observation, generally one quarter earlier.
The third and fourth column of Panel A of Table 2.1 presents the parameter
estimates using real-time data.

Again stock prices are found to be statistically

insignificant in affecting the monetary policy decision. The Hansen J-test doesn't reject
the overidentification restrictions and the Cragg-Donald F-statistic rejects the weak
identification problem. Thus, the instruments are found to be valid in terms of both
exogeneity and having a relatively strong correlation with the endogenous variables in the
model. Thus, the estimated coefficients of stock price from real-time data are unbiased
and more reliable than the estimates from the revised data set. As explained before, this
makes sense since the FOMC didn't have information about ex-post lags when making
policy decisions. Rather the Fed had forecasts made by its staff and the real-time data at
the time of policy decision.
As did Fuhrer and Tootell (2008), in addition to the full sample period under
consideration, Table 2.1 also reports estimates for two sub-samples. Panel B and C
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report the results for the pre-Greenspan era and the Greenspan era, respectively. The
results are consistent and provide similar conclusions that the Fed did not independently
respond to the stock price changes.

2.3.2. State Dependent Monetary Policy Rule
2.3.2.1. Asset Asymmetry
To examine the asymmetric response of the Fed to the stock price change, I
specified a stock market-augmented Taylor rule as in equation 2.4. The lags of change in
stock prices interacted with the dummy variable, measuring the underlying state of the
economy, are included in the model below:
i t = a + " F E . X , ^ + Y j U ^ S ^ + y a O ^ S , . , + y 3 (1 - u - o) t _, St_, + e t

2.7

where o is the dummy variable taking the value of 1 for the period of asset boom;
otherwise it has a value of zero, u is also the dummy having the value of 1 for the asset
bust quarters; otherwise it takes the value of zero.
The forecast of variables Xt+k in equation 2.7 follows the following process:
Xt+k = 0 I t + ^ u ^ S , . , + ^ o

H

S

H

+ X3 (1 - u - o)t_, St_, + u.t

2.8

The paper addresses two key questions: first, whether the stock price changes affect the
federal funds rate directly, so thaty.^O, in equation 2.7, or indirectly, used as
instruments for forecasting X t+k , so that A,, * 0 , in equation 2.8, i=l (asset boom), i=2
(asset bust), i=3 (no boom/bust); and second, whether the response of the Fed to stock
price movement depends on the state of the economy, so that the statistical significance
of y, s' are different at different states of the economy.
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Following Bordo and Jeanne (2002), the asset boom or bust periods are defined
when the three-year moving average of the growth rate in the asset price falls outside a
confidence interval defined by the first and second moment of the series. Given that St is
the growth rate in the stock price in period t and S is the average growth rate over all the
periods. Then if the average growth rate between year t - 2 and year t is larger than a
S +S +S
—
l
1
threshold, i.e., —- 1!
-=^- > S + u, then a boom is assumed in period t - 2 , t - 1 and
3
t, where uis the standard error of the series. Conversely a bust is assumed in the periods
t - 2 , t - l a n d t if S ' + S ' - i + S t - 2 < s - u .
3
Figure 1 below shows the stock price changes, with the boom and bust periods
marked with dark and light shaded bars, respectively. As evidenced from the figure, my
assumption or detection of periods with asset boom and bust coincide with known asset
price boom and bust cycles. It captures the late 1970's boom-bust cycle, the 1987 stock
price crash, the early 2000 bust, and the recent huge bust in stock prices.
Table 2.2 reports estimates of the target variables from asset asymmetric reaction
function using real-time data. The first column presents the parameter estimates using
Greenbook forecasts as instruments, as with Fuhrer and Tootell (2008). The second
column reports the estimates using surveys of professional forecasts as instruments. The
results from these two columns indicate that stock prices are statistically significant when
the economy was in the state of asset bust. In the non-bust periods, the stock prices are
found to be statistically insignificant in affecting the monetary policy decision. This
implies that the FOMC targeted stock prices when the economy was in a state of asst
bust. Specifically, as the stock price decreased by one percent in the period of asset bust,
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the Fed reduced the federal funds rate by at least 0.13 percent.

The FOMC did not

respond to stock price changes when the economy was in .a state of asset boom or normal
periods. The coefficient of inflation is above one and the coefficient of output gap is
above zero, which is consistent with the Taylor principle. The reported Hansen J-test and
Cragg-Donald F-statistic imply the instruments not only pass the overidentification
restrictions, but also are not weakly identified.

Hence, the estimates of the target

variables reported are reliable.

Figure 1: Stock Price Changes during Asset Boom and Bust Period

Orphanides (2003) proposed two specifications of forward-looking monetary
rules using real-time data. The first replaces one-quarter lagged inflation by forecasts of
inflation, but retains the one-quarter lagged output gap. The second adds the forecasted
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rate of growth of the output gap to the specification. Due to the limitation of forecasts of
output gap data, this paper presents the OLS estimation results from the first
specification. According to Orphanides (2003), it is not necessary to use instrumental
variable (IV) techniques since the real-time forecasts are based only on information
available contemporaneously.
The last two columns of Table 2.2 present the OLS estimates of the parameters
using GBFs and SPFs as regressors. Similar to the IV estimation results, stock price is
found to be significant in the state of asset bust. In the non-bust periods, the asset price
is found to be statistically insignificant.

Again from the OLS estimation the same

conclusion is made, that the Fed did directly respond to the stock market when the
economy was in the state of asset bust. The Fed did not independently respond to stock
prices in the non-bust periods.

In addition, the estimated coefficients of inflation and

output gap are in line with the Taylor principle.
2.3.2.2. Economy Asymmetry
The Fed's response to the stock market may vary not only at different states of the
asset market (i.e., asset boom and asset bust), but also at different states of the economy
(i.e., recession/expansion). Since the Fed's response could be asymmetric based on the
state of the economy, I also estimated a model recognizing the asymmetric response at
the state of recession and expansion. Thus, the variant of equation 2.7 and 2.8 is
specified as follows:
i t = a + ^ F E j X ^ + YxiuS,.! + y 2 (1 - r) t _ x St_x + e t
X t + k = © I t + ^ r ^ S , . , + X2 (1 - r) t _! S
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H

+ yxt

2.9
2.10

where r is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the recession quarters, and to 0 for nonrecession quarters. Table 2.3 presents the estimation results of the economy asymmetry
reaction function (i.e., equation 2.9) based on NBER recognition of recession/contraction
and non-recession periods.

Both the IV and OLS estimation results indicated that the

Fed responded to the stock market when the economy was in the state of contraction.
The Fed, however, did not target stock market during the non-recession periods.

2.4. Stock Price as Information Set

In addition to examining whether the Fed directly targeted stock prices, this paper
also looked at whether the Fed used the stock market as information set in forecasting the
main traditional targets. Table 2.4 presents the coefficient estimates for lagged stock
prices and their p-values for the estimated forecasting equations (2.6), (2.8), and (2.10).
The upper portion of the table presents those coefficients from symmetric specification.
The first column reports the coefficients using revised data with Greenbook forecasts, as
of Fuhrer and Tootell (2008). The lag of stock price turns out to be significant in
forecasting the policy target variables, i.e., inflation and unemployment rate.5 It implies
that the Fed did respond indirectly to stock price change, i.e., the Fed used stock price as
part of the information set in forecasting the policy targets.
The lower portions of Table 2.4 provide the coefficients for lagged stock prices
from asymmetric forecasting specifications. The first two columns under the lower
portion present those coefficients using Greenbook forecasts. The estimated coefficients
5

Unemployment rate is used as alternative to output gap, as a policy target variable, due
to data limitation on Greenbook forecast of output gap.
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in forecasting policy targets are found to be statistically different from zero no matter
what the state the economy was in. This implies that the Fed did use the change in stock
price as an information variable in forecasting the policy targets irrespective of the state
of the economy.
The last two columns in the lower panel of Table 2.4 present the coefficients of
lagged stock prices using SPFs. Again the change in stock price is found to be
statistically significant in forecasting inflation and unemployment rate. The change in
stock price had a negative and significant impact in forecasting inflation when the
economy experienced asset boom and bust. When the economy was in the state of asset
boom, the increase in asset price signaled a decrease in price level. On the other hand,
when the economy was at the state of asset bust, the decline in the asset price forecasted
inflationary pressure. Similarly, the stock price change had a significant impact in the
forecast of the unemployment rate. During the boom period, an increase in stock price
forecasted a decrease in unemployment rate, whereas a decline in stock price signaled an
increase in unemployment rate during the bust periods. From these results one can
conclude that the Fed used stock price movements as information in forecasting the target
variables regardless of the state of the economy.

2.5.

Conclusion

The increase in financial instability, of which one important dimension is
increased volatility of asset prices, has been the concern of policy makers and
researchers. The question is how the monetary authorities responded to the volatility of
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asset prices? Although previous studies try to answer this question, there is no consensus
among the researchers. This paper distinguishes the indirect response, where the FOMC
reacts to equity prices directly regardless of their effects on the target variables. In
addition, the paper models the reaction function as state-dependent, hypothesizing that
the FOMC may respond to changes in asset prices asymmetrically during different states
of the economy. This is in fact supported by different episodes of the asset price crash in
the 1990's and even the recent 2008 asset price bubble, where the Fed reduced the
interest rate to a historical low since the Great Depression.
The results, which are based on quarterly data for the period from 1966 to 2009
show that the FOMC did respond indirectly to the stock price change regardless of
whether the economy was experiencing an asset boom, bust, or a normal period. That
means the Fed used the stock market information in forecasting its policy targets. In
addition to the indirect response, the Federal Reserve responded directly to the change in
stock price when the economy experienced asset busts. Specifically, the Fed reduced the
interest rate, on average, at least by 13 points as the stock price decreased by one
percentage point.
It is apparent that the Fed could inject liquidity and build business confidence by
reducing the interest rate when the economy is in the state of asset bust or in state of
recession.

However, reversing business confidence could take time, and can't be

achieved in a short period of time. The possible instability, i.e., financial instability,
created after the asset reversal could bring a lot of damage to the economy. It is,
therefore, very important that the Fed should closely follow and respond to the stock
markets before the asset burst or reversal occurs. It might be important to analyze and
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estimate the threshold level of the change in stock price that the Fed should carefully
watch and respond accordingly. That is beyond the scope of this study and part of future
research.
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Table 2.1
Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation Results of Symmetric Monetary Reaction Function
Sample

Parameters

Estimated Coefficients
Revised Data
GBF

Unemployment rate

-1.215**

-3.150**

-1.282**

-3.755**

2.015**

3.450**

2.024**

3.350**

Real GDP Growth

0.638

0.983**

0.637

0.500

Stock Price

0.108

-0.027

0.121

-0.032

Lag of Federal funds rate

0.87**

0.94**

0.87**

0.94**

Hansen J-test

0.12

0.14

0.18

0.43

Cragg-Donald F-statistic

6.62

2.37

21.67

34.15

Panel B
Unemployment rate
Inflation
Real GDP Growth
Stock Price
Lag of Federal funds rate

PostGreenspan
(1987-2009)

SPF

Panel A
Inflation

PostGreenspan
(1966-1987)

GBF

SPF

Full sample
(1966-2009)

Real-time Data

-1.608

-2.725**

-1.570

-1.811**

3.052**

2.988**

2.892**

2.375**

0.123

0.413**

0.104

0.901**

0.191

-0.012

0.192

0.177

0.90**

0.92**

0.90**

0.90**

Hansen J-test

0.14

0.24

0.25

0.15

Cragg-Donald F-statistic

1.93

4.18

45.73

22.17

-1.363

-1.067

-0.818

-0.407

2.333**

1.393**

2.273**

1.333**

1.063

0.307

0.745**

0.320

Panel C
Unemployment rate
Inflation
Real GDP Growth
Stock Price
Lag of Federal funds rate

0.154

0.180

0.145

0.113

0.89**

0.85**

0.89**

0.85**

Hansen J-test

0.21

0.22

0.34

0.21

Cragg-Donald F-statistic

2.66

6.31

32.51

33.91

** (PO.05)
it = o t + x F X t + 1 + y S t _ i - r - p i t _ 1 + s t ,
Xt+1 =(yt+1 Ayt+1 7tt+1) and v = (p 6 0),
where i( is Federal funds rate, y, is unemployment rate/Output gap. Ay, is Real GDP
growth rate. nt is Inflation rate. S, is change in S&P 500 stock price index, p ; 8 ^ anc j 9
are parameter coefficients of inflation, unemployment rate/output gap and Real GDP
growth, respectively. Greenbook Forecasts (GBFs) or Survey of Professional Forecasts
(SPFs) and four lags of change in stock prices are used as instruments. The critical values
for the Cragg-Donald F statstic are: 20.27 at 5% and 10.77 at 10% based on relative bias
and 33.51 and 15.07 based on relative size. The test rejects the null if the Cragg-Donald
F-static exceeds the critical value.
27

Table 2.2
Estimation Results of Asset Asymmetry Reaction Function
Estimated Coefficients
parameters

Unemployment rate
Real GDP Growth
Inflation

IV

OLS

GBF as
instruments
-1.462**

SPF as
instruments
-0.84

0.369

1.016**

2.031**

2.34**

output gap

GBF of as
regressors

SPF as
regressors

1.53**

1.33**

0.57

0.69

Stock Price
Asset Boom
Asset Bust

-0.062

-0.11

0.073

0.031

0.292**

0.225**

0.125**

0.167**

No Asset Boom/Bust

0.365

0.184

0.067

0.012

Lag of Federal funds rate

0.87**

0.90**

0.85**

0.85**

0.85

0.83

Hansen J-test
Cragg-Donald F-statistic
R2

0.54

0.80

36.33

29.65

0.79

0.84

** (P<0.05)
i t = a + *FX t + 1 + Y i U ^ S ^ + Y ^ ^ S ^ + y 3 (1 - u - o ) ^ St_x + s t ,
X t+1 =(y t+l Ayt+1 n t+1 ) and *F = (P 5 9 ) ,
where i t : Federal funds rate. yt:
unemployment rate/Output gap, n, : Inflation rate, annual rate, S t : Percent change
in S&P 500 stock price index, o and u are dummy for Boom and Bust periods,
respectively, p , 5 , a n c j 9 a r e parameter coefficients of inflation, output gap and
Real GDP growth, respectively. Ti, Y2, and Y3 are parameter coefficients of stock
price change during the period of asset boom, asset bust and normal period,
respectively.
Greenbook Forecasts (GBFs) or Survey of Professional Forecasts
(SPFs) and four lags of change in stock prices are used as instruments.The critical
values for the Cragg-Donald F statistic are: 20.27 at 5% and 10.77 at 10% based on
relative bias and 33.51 and 15.07 based on relative size. The test rejects the null if
the Cragg-Donald F-static exceeds the critical value.
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Table 2.3
Estimation Results of Economy Asymmetry Reaction Function
Estimated Coefficients
Parameters

IV
GBF as
instruments

Unemployment rate
Real GDP Growth
Inflation

OLS
SPF as
instruments

-0.733**

-1.117**

0.667

0.750

1.687**

2.800**

output gap

GBF of
inflation as
regressor

SPF of inflation
as regressor

1.873**

1.429***

0.873**

1.021**

Stock Price
Recession
Non-recession

0.093**

0.056**

0.127**

0.186**

0.005

0.003

0.086

0.054

0.85

0.83

0.84

0.82

Lag of Federal funds rate

0.85

0.91

Hansen J-test

0.49

0.12

43.11

23.98

0.82

0.85

Cragg-Donald F-statistic
R2

** (PO.05)
i t =a + WXt+1 +yirt_lSt_l + y 2 ( l - r ) t _ 1 S t _ 1 + s t , Xt+1 =(yt+I Ayt+17tt+1)and
T = (P 5 9) where i t is Federal funds rate. _y, is unemployment rate/Output gap. Ay, is
Real GDP growth rate. 7tt is Inflation rate. S, is change in S&P 500 stock price index, p,
5 and 9 a r e parameter coefficients of inflation, output gap and Real GDP growth,
respectively. Greenbook Forecasts (GBFs) or Survey of Professional Forecasts (SPFs)
and four lags of change in stock prices are used as instruments. The critical values for the
Cragg-Donald F statistic are: 20.27 at 5% and 10.77 at 10% based on relative bias and
33.51 and 15.07 based on relative size. The test rejects the null if the Cragg-Donald Fstatic exceeds the critical value.
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Table 2.4
Information Set and Stock Price Change
Parameters

Estimated Coefficients
GBF

SPF

Symmetric Model
Inflation

0.0188**

0.0106**

Unemployment rate

-0.0057**

-0.0102**

Real GDP Growth

0.0212**

0.0175**

Asymmetric Model
Asset
Asymmetry

Economy
Asymmetry

Asset
Asymmetry

Economy
Asymmetry

Inflation
Asset Boom

0.006**

-0.001**

Asset Bust

0.054**

0.0367**

No Asset Boom/Bust

-0.007**

-0.0051**

Recession

0.054**

Non-recession

0.009**

0.037**
0.002**

Unemployment rate
Asset Boom

-0.003**

0.007**

Asset Bust

-0.009**

0.021**

No Asset Boom/Bust

-0.002**

0.0002**

Recession
Non-recession

-0.013**

0.022**

-0.004

0.007**

Real GDP Growth
Asset Boom
Asset Bust
No Asset Boom/Bust

-0.002

-0.018

0.045**

0.031**

-0.002

0.0110

Recession

-0.059

0.001**

Non-recession

-0.014

-0.013

** (PO.05)
Symmetric Model: Xt+1 = 0 1 , + A^r^S,^ +X2(l-r),_jS,^ + yit
Asymmetric Model:
x, +1 = ©I, + A^u.^S,,, + A^o^S,., + A.3 (l - u - o)t_j S,^ + n t
andXt+1 =(yt+i Ayt+17it+1), where y t : unemployment rate/Output gap, nt : Inflation
rate, annual rate, Ay: Real GDP growth. I, is a vector contains four lags of inflation,
unemployment rate and real GDP growth, and GBF/SPFs of inflation, unemployment
rate and real GDP growth. S,: Percent change in S&P 500 stock price index, o and u
are dummy for Boom and Bust periods, respectively, r = 1 a dummy for recession
periods.
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CHAPTER III

ASYMMETRIC BANK RISK TAKING AND MONETARY POLICY

3.1.

Introduction

The financial crisis that began in the summer of 2007 was an extraordinarily
complex event.

Troubles in the credit markets negatively affected banks, liquidity

evaporated in the interbank markets, and central banks intervened on a scale not often
seen before. Many market observers and researchers claimed that the low interest rate is
the main cause for this crisis. A low interest rate may encourage banks to take more risk
in different ways. Low returns on investments, such as government bonds or risk-free
assets, may increase incentives for asset managers to take on more risks for contractual,
behavioral or institutional reasons (Rajan, 2005). Low interest rates can make banks take
more risk through their impact on valuation, income, and cash flow (Adrian and Shin,
2008, Bario and Zhu, 2008).
Yet the question of how monetary policy affects banks' risk-taking is the key to
the current debate over what role financial stability considerations should play in the
monetary policy decisions. Most of the debates so far have focused on how monetary
policy easing can induce greater risk-taking through a search for yield or its effect on
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leverage, a view this paper broadly supports.6 But there could be an opposite riskshifting effect when the banks operate with limited capital or excess liability and a
weaker capital regulation in the financial system (De Nicolo, 2010). The response of
well-capitalized (high-capital or capital-unconstrained) banks to monetary policy easing
could be different from the poorly capitalized (low-capital or capital-constrained) banks.
The limited capital constraint could allow the high-capital banks to expand their loans
and take more risk, responding to the fall in short term interest rate, while the poorly
capitalized banks could do the opposite. Thus, the main objective of this paper is
exploring the asymmetric response of high-capital and low-capital banks (called crosssectional asymmetry) to the change in monetary policy.
Furthermore, the empirical studies so far fail to distinguish between the effects of
the two policy instances (i.e., contractionary policy and expansionary policy) on banks'
risk-taking response. It is unclear whether expansionary policy (a reduction in interest
rate), or contractionary policy (a rise in interest rate), or both drive the empirical results.
Recently, the Bank Lending Channel (BLC) literature identified the asymmetric loan
supply response associated with the two policy instances for a given capital-constrained
banks. According to this literature, expansionary policy has a weak effect on increasing
the loan supply of capital-constrained banks, whereas contractionary policy has a strong
effect on decreasing the loan supply of capital-constrained banks. Likewise, for the
capital-unconstrained banks, expansionary policy has a strong stimulating effect on loan
supply, and contractionary monetary policy has a weak or no effect on banks' loan supply
(Kishan and Opeiela, 2000). This asymmetric response is observed not only in loan
6

These include Borio and Zhu (2008), Adrain and Shin (2008), Altunbas et al. (2009),
Diamond and Rajan (2009) and Taylor (2009).
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supply, but also on the risk-taking response of loan-supplying institutions, i.e., banks
(Borio and Zhu, 2008).

Thus, this paper also compares the separate effects of

contractionary and expansionary policy independently on risk-taking behavior of both
low-capital and high-capital banks.
Using quarterly data on balance sheet items of federally insured banks spanning
the period from 1991 :Q1 to 2010:Q1, this paper analyzes how the change in federal funds
rate affect banks' risk-taking. The result from the symmetric model indicated a positive
link between the interest rate and banks' risk-taking, indicating that banks take more risks
as the federal funds rate increases, and banks take fewer risks as the interest rate falls.
However, this positive link between the change in the short-term interest rate and banks'
risk-taking disappeared when the policy is disaggregated into two: contractionary and
expansionary policy. Specifically, expansionary policies were effective and encouraged
banks to take more risk, while contractionary policies were ineffective in affecting the
banks' risk.
In addition, the above policy-asymmetric responses disappeared as the sample is
divided based on the leverage ratio: high-capital and low-capital banks. Well-capitalized
banks responded more strongly to expansionary policy, while the poorly capitalized
banks did not respond at all. More particularly, a one percentage fall in the interest rate
increased the high-capital banks' risk ranging from 8 percent to 17 percent. The results
also show that contractionary policy didn't have any significant effect on the risk-taking
behavior of all banks independent of the level of capitalization.
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The next section presents the empirical methodology and the data used in the
empirical analysis. The empirical results from symmetric and asymmetric specifications
are presented in Section 3.3. Finally, Section 3.4 provides the conclusions of the paper.

3.2.

Empirical Methodology and Data

Most of the mechanisms proposed so far in the literature point out a negative
relationship between the monetary policy and banks' risk.

Indeed, monetary policy

easing induces greater risk-taking through a search for yield (Rajan, 2005, Bario and Zhu,
2008), asset substitution (Fishburn and Porter, 1976), and its effect on leverage and asset
valuation (Adrian and Shin, 2008, Altunbas et al, 2010). A "search for yield" argument
goes as follows. Financial institutions with long-term commitments, such as insurance
companies, need to match the yield they promised on their liabilities with what they
obtain on their assets (Rajan, 2005). When interest rates are low, they are forced to
invest in riskier assets to match the yield on their liabilities. If yields on safe assets
remain low for a prolonged period, financial institutions will need to default on their
long-term commitments. When interest rates are high, they can generate the necessary
revenue by investing in safe assets.
A related mechanism operates through asset substitution.

Under general

conditions, a lower yield on safe assets will lead banks to decrease their portfolio
holdings. Risk-neutral and risk-loving banks will increase their demand for risky assets
until equilibrium returns and both types of investments are equalized. Risk-averse banks,
however, could reallocate their portfolios and hold safer assets under most utility
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functions (Fishburn and Porter, 1976). A complementary mechanism that a fall in the
interest rate can encourage risk-taking is through leverage channel (Adrain and Shin,
2008). Banks react by buying or selling assets when faced with shocks to their profits
and leverage. Monetary policy easing boasts asset prices and increases banks' equity
relative to corporate debt. Then banks respond to the fall in leverage by increasing the
holding of risky assets (Adrian and Shin, 2008).
Asymmetric information is the key to this negative relationship between monetary
policy easing and banks' risk-taking. Risk-neutral leveraged banks behave like riskloving agents since they do not internalize the losses they impose on depositors and
investors. If investors were able to correctly price the bank's risk-taking at the margin,
the incentive to invest in an excessively risky portfolio would disappear. The higher
private yield of riskier investments would be compensated for by the higher cost of the
bank's liabilities. However, since investors cannot observe the bank's portfolio, excess
risk-taking occurs even when the bank's liabilities are priced correctly (Keely, 1990).
The charter value hypothesis, on the other hand, claimed a positive link between
monetary easing and banks' risk-taking. In the formal frameworks of this channel
developed by De Nicolo (2010), a reduction in the policy rate leads to lower deposit rates
passing through lending rates. Assuming a fully leveraged bank that is financed fully
through deposits, a cut in the policy rate would increase the bank's expected net return on
all its assets by lowering the rate it has to pay on deposits. But this increase would be
disproportionately larger for safer assets, since the bank's investment in these assets
means a higher probability that it will have to repay depositors. It follows that a
reduction in the policy rate makes riskier assets relatively less attractive.
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This is

consistent with results in Altunbas et al. (2010), who use data from European and US
banks, and find that increases in interest rates and negative Taylor rule residuals are
positively associated with default risk measures.
To examine this link between monetary policy and banks' risk-taking, the
following model was designed (Altunbas et al., 2010):

AR,.t =p0 +P,AR,,t_1 + I M V , + I X M t - J +IX.-1 + £ u
J=0

j=0

3.1

j=0

where i = 1,...,N, and t = 1,...,T, N is the number of banks, and T is the final year. R, t
represents bank risk by bank i at period t. it is the short-term interest rate.

M t isthe

vector of macroeconomic variables and B] tis the vector of bank-specific characteristics.
The link between monetary policy and bank risk could also be influenced by the
balance sheet or bank-specific characteristics that summarize the ability and willingness
of banks to supply additional loans (Lepetit et al., 2008, Konishi and Yasuda, 2004). In
this paper, therefore, three variables are introduced to capture the bank-specific
characteristics: ASSET (the log of total assets), LIQ (liquidity to total assets) and CAP
(the capital-to-asset ratio).

Well-capitalized banks and banks with a more liquid

portfolio are more likely risky, given that all other things are equal (Kishan and Opeiela,
2000).

The effect of ASSET on bank risk is negative because larger banks are more

capable of managing risks (and thus less risky) than small banks (Lepetit et al, 2008 and
Konish and Yasuda, 2004).
The macroeconomic condition of the economy could also affect the link between
monetary policy and bank risk. Better economic conditions that are captured by nominal
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GDP growth increase the number of projects that become profitable in terms of expected
net present value, and thereby reduce the overall credit risk of the banks (Altunbas et al,
2009 and 2010). The overall profitability of banks, estimated by the slope of the yield
curve, also affects their risk-taking behavior. Thus the steeper the yield curve, the greater
the negative effect on bank risk, since their assets have a longer maturity than liabilities
(Altunbas et al. 2010). According to Altunbas et al. (2010), the evolution of asset price
and housing price are also introduced in the model to take into account the improvements
in borrowers' net worth and collateral. An increase in asset prices or housing prices
increases the value of collateral and thus reduces the overall credit risk (Altunbas et al,
2010).
Quarterly data on balance sheet items of federally insured banks spanning the
period from 1976 quarter 1 to 2010 quarter 1 are used. These data were obtained from
the Report of Condition and Income (or Call Report) that all insured banks submit to the
Federal Reserve. The data contains information for over 6000 banks operated each year
across the country.

All the banks, including merged or bankrupt banks, are considered

as long as the balance sheet information is available. However, those banks having
information of less than four quarters are dropped from the sample. Macroeconomic
variables, i.e., the federal funds rate, nominal GDP, and ten-year government bond rate,
are obtained from the Federal Reserve System database. The housing price index is
obtained from the Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). The S&P 500 price
index is used as a measure of stock price, which is obtained from EconStat data base.
The slope of the yield curve is calculated as the difference between the ten-year
government bond yields and the short term interest rate, i.e., federal funds rate.
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The

deviation of the interest rate from the benchmark measure is calculated as the difference
between the real short-term interest rate and the "natural interest rate," calculated using
the Hodrick-Prescott filter.7
The standard ex post measures of banks' risk, based on quarterly accounting data
and calculated for each bank throughout the period, are used in this study. These
measures are: (i) the standard deviation of the return on assets (SDROA); (ii) the standard
deviation of the return on equity (SDROE); and (iii) the ratio of loan loss provisions to
total loans (LLP). I also computed the insolvency risk measure Z-score (ZSCORE
hereafter) which is developed by Boyd et al. (1993).

The ZSCORE is a statistic

indicating the probability of bankruptcy, which is calculated as: ZSCORE = (ROA +
EA)/SDROA, where ROA is net income-total asset ratio and EA is equity-asset ratio.
Since the ZSCORE is negatively associated with the insolvency risk, I define the
downside risk as being the negative value of the ZSCORE.

3.3.

Empirical Results

This paper employs first difference to obtain the estimates of the model, as
proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The dynamic
GMM estimator allows for a number of advantages. It exploits the time series element of
the data and in differences, it controls for firm-specific effects, like the fixed-effect
method. It also allows for the inclusion of lagged dependent variables as regressors and
7

Two additional benchmark measures have been used: (i) generated by "Taylor rule"
with interest rate smoothing and (ii) generated by a standard "Taylor rule" using equal
weights on output and inflation and no interest rate smoothing.
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controls for the endogeneity of explanatory variables (Roodman, 2006). The GMM
method can be applied when: (1) N is large but T is small; (2) the explanatory variables
are endogenous, and (3) unobserved firm-specific effects are correlated with other
regressors. In fact, GMM estimators ensure efficiency and consistency provided that the
models are not subject to serial correlation of order two and the instruments used are
valid (which is tested with the Sargan test).

This section reports banks' risk-taking

response to symmetric monetary policy using four different alternative measures of
banks' risk. It also reports the banks' risk-taking response to asymmetric monetary
policy (i.e., contractionary and expansionary monetary policy). In addition, the crosssection asymmetric responses of high-capital banks and low-capital banks to monetary
policy are presented in this section.

3.3.1. Symmetric and Asymmetric Monetary Policy
The results for symmetric and asymmetric effects of monetary policy on risk-taking
behavior of all the banks in the sample are contained in Table 3.1. The first two columns
report the results using the negative of the change in ZSCORE as the dependent variable
and measure of banks' risk. As presented in the first column, the coefficients associated
with the change in the federal funds rate are significant and positive, indicating that the
lower interest rate discourages banks from taking more risk. This result is consistent with
the other three alternative measures of banks' risk. The overall quality of a loan portfolio
indeed increases; thereby the banks' risk falls, if interest rates are lower. This is
consistent with the findings of Jimenez et al. (2009) and Altunbas et al. (2010). It is also
consistent with the theoretical prediction of Dimoand and Rajan (2009) who indicate that
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the drop in banks' risk is probably reinforced by the reduction in bank funding liquidity
cost after the decrease in the short-term interest rate.
Unlike the previous studies the paper also examines the effect of the asymmetric
monetary policy on banks' risk and thus divides the monetary policy into two:
contractionary and expansionary monetary policy. In this study, an increase in the
federal funds rate implies contractionary policy, whereas a decrease in the federal funds
rate implies an expansionary policy. As reported in Table 3.1, most of the coefficients
associated with an expansionary monetary policy are negative and significant, indicating
that an expansionary monetary policy encouraged banks to take more risk, whereas the
coefficient associated with a contractionary policy are insignificant across all the
specifications.

This implies that an expansionary monetary policy had been more

effective and encourages banks to invest in risky assets. Specifically, a one percent
reduction in the short-term interest rate increased banks' risk-taking, on average, with a
range of 0.3% to 18%. The reliability of the above results are tested and supported by
the Sargen test and the second order auto-correlation test.

3.3.2. Cross-sectional Asymmetric Risk-taking
In order to exploit the different risk-taking behaviors of highly leveraged or lowcapital banks and high-capital banks (i.e. cross-sectional asymmetry), the sample is
classified based on banks' leverage ratio. Banks with a capital leverage ratio below 8%
are considered to be low-capital (capital-constrained) banks, whereas banks with a
leverage ratio 8% and above are high-capital (capital-unconstrained) banks. My choice
of a benchmark ratio as 8% is based on two considerations. First, 8% is the 25th
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percentile for my sample and one can make the argument that a bank may be considered
constrained if its leverage ratio is below the 25th percentile. Second, 8% is the minimum
regulatory requirement based on a 100% risk weight.
A comparison of the balance sheet items and bank-risk measures for high- and
low-capital banks yields some noteworthy differences. Table 3.2 reports the mean of the
balance sheet variables (ASSET, CAP and LIQ) and four alternative measures of banks'
risk. While we cannot make definitive statements about the risk-taking behavior of banks
by looking at the mean comparison test, the mean differences can help to understand the
possible different behavior of the two groups of banks.

As indicated by the t-test

statistics, the mean of the alternative measures of banks' risk are all statistically different
between the low- and high-capital banks. It also indicates that the mean value of the risk
measures higher for high-capital banks as compared to low-capital banks.

This

comparison test also shows that the two groups of banks are significantly different in
terms of their bank specific characteristics. The mean capital-to-asset ratio for lowcapital banks is about 7%, which is below our benchmark of 8%. The high-capital banks
are more liquidated and highly capitalized as compared to low-capital banks.
The asymmetric response of high-capitalized and low-capitalized banks to the
change in monetary policy is analyzed by estimating the baseline model for the two
groups of banks separately.

Table 3.3 reports the effect of expansionary and

contractionary monetary policy on low- and high-capital banks' risk-taking separately.
The coefficients associated with expansionary monetary policy for low-capital banks are
all insignificant, indicating that expansionary policy seems to have no stimulating effect
for these banks to take more risk. Contractionary policy didn't have any significant
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effect on capital-constrained banks either. This implies that no change in monetary
policy had any significant effect on the risk-taking of capital-constrained banks.
However, all of the coefficients associated with expansionary monetary policy are
negative and significant for high-capital banks. High-capital banks' risk-taking increased
on average with a range of 8% to 17% as the short-term interest rate declined by one
percent. This indicates that high-capital banks were involved in risky investments during
the period of expansionary policy. The fall in the short-term interest rate didn't have a
significant effect on the risk of capitalized banks. Thus, the results indicate that an
expansionary monetary policy induced high-capital banks to invest in risk asset, while
not significantly affecting the risk-taking behavior of low-capital banks. However,
contractionary monetary policy didn't have any significant impact on risk-taking
behavior of either high- or low-capital banks.
In addition to the change in the monetary policy rate, balance sheet characteristics
of banks have a significant effect on banks' risk-taking. As indicated in Table 3.3, the
banks' size (ASSET) has a significant and positive effect on banks' risk. It means that
the bigger the bank is, either both high- and low-capital banks, the higher the incentive to
take more risk, given that all other things are constant.
To summarize, during the period 1991 - 2010, monetary policy easing had a
significant impact on encouraging low-capitalized banks to take more risk, while the
capital-constrained banks weren't significantly affected by the monetary policy easing.
This confirms the hypothesis that expansionary policy induces capitalize-unconstrained
banks to invest more in risky assets relative to safe assets. However, this result could be
affected by the change in regulatory requirements in the banking system.
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In the

following section, I also explore the risk-taking behavior of capital-constrained and
unconstrained banks before the capital regulations made in the late 1980s and the early
1990's.

3.3.3. Banks' Risk during the Pre-Basel/FDICIA Period
The cross-sectional response of banks to a monetary policy stance could be
different depending on the capital regulation in the financial system. Some banking
literature states that capital regulation is motivated by the need to avoid the risk-shifting
incentives generated by improperly priced deposit insurance, since an unregulated bank
may take excessive portfolio and leverage risk in order to maximize its shareholder value,
at the expense of the deposit insurance (Kishan and Opiela, 2006; Koziol and Lawrenz,
2009). Two important changes in capital regulation took place in the period from 1988 to
1992. The Basel Accord I, which set capital-to-risk-weighted asset and leverage ratio
requirements, was adopted in 1988 and phased in through the end of 1992. FDICIA was
passed in 1991, strengthening enforcement and transparency of penalties associated with
both the leverage and the new risk-weighted Basel requirements.

Essentially, the

regulatory capital literature emphasizes an increase in the effective capital constraint and
describes the capital regulatory environment as being weak during the pre-Basel/FDICIA
period relative to the post-Basel/FDICIA period (Berger et al., 1995). This section,
therefore, explores the cross-sectional asymmetric response of banks to the two policy
instances during the pre-Basel/FDICIA (i.e. 1976:Q1-1990:4) period.
Table 3.4 presents the estimation results of the baseline model for the preBasel/FDICIA period. Most of the coefficients of expansionary monetary policy are
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negative and significant irrespective of the level of capitalization. This indicates that
both capital-constrained and unconstrained banks were taking more risk during the period
of expansionary policy. However, as I compare the qualitative difference between the
coefficients of expansionary policy for low- and high-capital banks, I realize that the lowcapital banks strongly respond to the fall in the interest rate.

Specifically, a one-

percentage fall in the short-term interest rate lead to an increase in risk-taking of lowcapital banks by at least 1%, while the high-capital banks' risk-taking increased by at
least 0.1 %. However, most of the coefficients associated with contractionary monetary
policy are positive and significant for high-capital banks, while insignificant for lowcapital banks. The results above clearly indicate the asymmetric response of banks is
affected by the apparent differences in the effective capital constraint between the preBasel/FDICIA period and the post-Basel/FDICIA period.
In summary, in the pre-Basel/FDICIA period, when the capital constraints were
weak, contractionary policy was ineffective for low-capital banks, but expansionary
policy increased the risk of these banks. In the post-Basel period, marked by a stronger
effective constraint, expansionary policy increased the risk of high-capital banks, but
contractionary policy was ineffective for both low- and high-capital banks. It implies that
the capital regulation made in the late 1980's and early 1990's (i.e. Basel I and FDICA)
were not effective in reducing the risk-taking behavior of high-capital banks.
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3.4.

Conclusion

The recent financial crisis that started in the summer of 2007 has drawn the
attention of researchers and policy makers to examine the link between monetary policy
and banks' risk-perceptions and attitude (Adrian and Shin, 2008, Borio and Zhu, 2008
and Altunbas et al., 2010). Most of the researches so far support the view that monetary
policy easing induces greater risk-taking by banks through a search for yield, or its
effects on leverage. This paper broadly supports this view. But, there could be an
opposite risk-shifting effect when the banks operate with sufficient capital or limited
liability and the appropriate regulation in the financial system. The response of wellcapitalized banks to the change in policy rate could be different from the response of
poorly capitalized banks. Due to the capital constraint, the poorly capitalized banks
could respond aggressively to the lower interest rate. Furthermore, the empirical studies
so far fail to distinguish the effects on contractionary and expansionary monetary policy
on banks' risk. It is unclear whether contractionary policy, expansionary policy, or both
drive the negative link between monetary policy and banks' risk.
This paper empirically explores the risk-taking response of low-capital and highcapital banks (cross-sectional asymmetry) during the two policy instances (policyasymmetry). The results show that expansionary monetary policy had the expected effect
on high-capital banks. That is, expansionary policy increased the risk of high-capital
banks, but didn't have significant effect on the risk of low-capital banks. Contractionary
monetary policy didn't have any significant impact on the risk-taking behavior of both
high- and low-capital banks. This asymmetric response may change in nature and
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intensity due to the changes in regulatory capital constraints. Accordingly this paper also
identified these differences and finds that both high- and low-capital banks that increased
their risk were responding to the fall in the short-term interest rate during the preBasel/FDICIA period.

Again during the pre-Basel/FDICIA period, contractionary

monetary policy was effective in increasing the risk of high-capital banks, but not the
low-capital banks. This is consistent with the argument that the regulatory capital
constraint was weak during the pre-Basel/FDICA period, allowing the low-capital banks
to respond strongly to expansionary policy.
The above result implies that monetary policy should carefully consider the
overall capitalization of the banking system and the capital regulation in formulating
monetary policy. The capital constraints imposed by Basel II, which is currently being
implemented by some banks (i.e., core banks), may encourage even greater volatility in
loans over the business cycle (Kashyap and Stein, 2004). If Basel II does create more
constrained banks during recessions and better capitalized banks during expansions, my
analysis suggests that countercyclical policy may be even more difficult.

The change

brought about by Basel II might result in banks reallocating their capital and
consequently, adjusting the way they organize their balance sheets and the way they react
to monetary policy shocks. Thus, it could be worthy to identify the implication of these
new regulations on the risk-taking behavior of banks.
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Table 3.4
Estimation Results for Pre-Basel Period for Low and
High Capital Banks, 1976:1-1990:4
Explanatory
Variables
-AZSCORE
AZSCORE lt _!

ALLP

ASDROA

CAP
4^
-O

CONSTANT
Sargen test
nd

2 order serial
correlation

ALLP

ASDROA

ASDROE

-0.088**
-0.328**
-0.381**

-0.043**

ASDROE lt _!

LIQ

AZSCORE

-0.360**

ASDROA,,^

Ai*CONT
ASSET

ASDROE

-0.038**

ALLPlt_,

Ai*EXPA

High-Capital Banks

Low-Capital Banks

-0.341**

-0.556**
-0.428**

-0.002**

-0.011

-0.123**

-0.160**

-0.001**

-0.003

0.087

0.280

0.001

-0.001

0.159**

0.035**

0.009**

-0.002

-0.587**

0.966**

0.001**

0.001

-0.507**

2.506**

0.010**

-0.005

-0.330**

-0.002

0.005

0.021

0.006

-0.008**

0.005

-0.002

-0.004

-0.518**

0.391**

0.005**

0.013

-0.240**

0.076

0.004**

-0.005

0.556**

-0.243**

0.009

0.019

0.777

-0.561

-0.004

0.159**

0.66

0.80

0.11

0.54

0.40

0.47

0.22

0.35

0.23

0.43

0.59

0.88

0.73

0.61

0.41

0.18

** (P<0.05)
The model is given by the following equation:
A R M = P0 + P.AR,,^ + £ p f Ai t _, + £ p m M t _ , + £ B M _ , + s M
j=0

,=0

j=0

where i = 1,...,N, and t = 1,...,T, N is the number of banks, and T is the final year. Rt, represents bank risk by bank i
at period t. i t is the short term interest rate. M t is the vector of macroeconomic variables (which includes:
Aln(GDPN), YIELD and GAP) andB lt is the vector of bank-specific characteristics that includes: ASSET , LIQ and
CAP. The results reported here are qualitatively similar when the change in stock price (SP500) and the change in
housing price index (HPT) are included in the model.

Table 3.2
Mean Comparison Test
Mean
Variable

(CAP>8)
-ZSCORE
LLP
SDROA
SDROE
ASSET
CAP
LIQ
N

T-test
Low-Capital Banks

High-Capital Banks

(CAP<B

-15.953
0.325
0.004
0.000
11.368
11.974
5.665
522701

-25.224
0.0.243
0.004
0.001
11.738
7.037
5.556
179057

86.561**
4.423*
18.094**
14.795**
50.608**
-4.877**
3.680**

** Significant at 1% (*)and 5% (**) level.
The four bank risk measures are: ZSCORE, LLP, SDROA, and SDROE. SIZE is
a log of total assets, CAP the capital-to-total asset ratio, LIQ the liquidity-to-total
assets ratio, LLP the loan loss provisions/total loans, SDROA is the standard
deviation of ROA, and SDROE is the standard deviation of ROE, where ROA is
net income-total asset ratio and ROE is net income-to-total asset ratio.
** Significant at 1% (*)and 5% (**) level.
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Table 3.3
Estimation Results for High and Low Capital Banks, 1991:1-2010:1
Explanatory
Variables

Low-Capital Banks
-AZSCORE

AZSCORE,,,!

ALLP

ASDROA

High-Capital Banks
ASDROE

-0.023**

AZSCORE

ALLP

ASDROA

ASDROE

-0.090**

ALLP lt _,

-0.385**

-0.241**

-0.304**

-0.230**

ASDROA,,,,
ASDROE lt _j

-0.246**

-0.161**

Ai*EXPA

0.145

-0.041

-0.076

0.042

-0.170**

-0.089**

-0.186**

-0.098**

Ai*CONT
ASSET

-0.071

0.027

0.044

-0.025

0.087

0.041

0.036

-0.022

0.079**

0.176**

0.089**

0.086**

0.184**

0.156**

0.053

-0.087

-0.009

-0.009

-0.002

-0.004

0.005

-0.018**

-0.005

-0.004

0.259**

0.081**

0.013**

0.047**

0.140

-0.032

-0.007

-0.002

-0.423

0.624

LIQ
CAP
CONSTANT
Sargen test
nd

2 order serial
correlation

-2.381**

-2.442**

1.234**

-1.139**

-5.805

-1.592

0.18

0.29

0.20

0.13

0.16

0.37

0.11

0.35

0.31

0.46

0.69

0.27

0.73

0.55

0.41

0.18

** (P<0.05)
The model is given by the following equation:
AR,,, = Po + P.AR,,,-. + S P f Ait_j + X P m M t _ J + I B . ^ + e M
1=0

,=0

,=0

where i = 1,...,N, and t = 1,...,T, N is the number of banks, and T is the final year. Rlt represents bank risk by bank /at
period t. i, is the short-term interest rate, M, is the vector of macroeconomic variables (which includes: Aln(GDPN)
YIELD and GAP) andB l t is the vector of bank-specific characteristics that includes: SIZE, LIQ, and CAP. The results
reported here are qualitatively similar when the change in stock price (SP500) and the change in housing price index (HPI)
are included in the model.

Table 3.1
Estimation Results of Symmetric and Asymmetric Specifications, 1991:1-2010:1
Explanatory

Dependent Variable/Risk Measures

Variables

-AZSCORE,
ALLP,,,-,
ASDROA,,^
ASDROE,t_,
Ai
Ai*EXP
Ai*CONT
ASSET

o

ALLP

-AZSCORE
w

-0.076**

ASDROA

ASDROE

-0.075**
-0.491**

-0.492**
-0.491**

-0.492**
-0.179**

0.188**

0.004**

0.044**
-0.092**

-0.187**

0.001**
-0.001

0.016

0.170

-0.191**

-0.003**

0.003

-0.007

0.302**

0.213**

0.161

0.151

0.016

0.004

0.014

0.016

LIQ

-0.013**

-0.015**

-0.023**

-0.024**

-0.002**

-0.002**

-0.004**

-0.004**

CAP

0.335**

0.021**

0.0282

0.021**

0.002**

0.016**

0.024**

0.022**

Sargent Test

0.31

0.36

0.55

0.61

0.13

0.19

0.74

0.80

2 nd order serial
correlation

0.15

0.09

0.14

0.33

0.39

0.25

0.29

0.17

** (P<0.05)
The model is given by the following equation:
AR M = P 0 + P.AR,,,., + £ p f Ai,^ + ZP m M,_ J + i B M _ , + £,,t
j=0

j=0

1=0

where i = l,...,N, and t = 1,...,T,N is the number of banks, and T is the final year. R l t represents bank risk by bank
iat period t. i, is the short term interest rate. M, is the vector of macroeconomic variables (which includes:
Aln(GDPN), YIELD and GAP) andB,,is the vector of bank-specific characteristics that includes: ASSET , LIQ,
and CAP. The results reported here are qualitatively similar when the change in stock price (SP500) and the change
in housing price index (HPI) are included in the model.

CHAPTER IV

HOUSING BUBBLES ACROSS U.S. STATES AND MONETARY POLICY:
EVIDENCE FROM A SPATIAL DYNAMIC MODEL
4.1. Introduction

The global financial crisis triggered by fallout from the sub-prime mortgage
market in the U.S. has led economists to focus attention on the role of monetary policy in
the recent boom and bust behavior of housing prices. Some argue that the Federal
Reserve System interest rate policy, especially the low rates during the period 2001-2005,
was responsible for the housing price boom (lacoviello, 2005, Taylor, 2007, loannidou et
al., 2007 and Jarocinski and Smets, 2008,). On the other hand, in his speech at the 2010
Economic Association Annual Conference, the Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke
argued that it is difficult to blame either monetary policy or the broader macroeconomic
environment for the housing bubble. Although not universally held, this view has gained
acceptance from many researchers and observers (Vargas-Silva, 2008, Greenspan, 2009,
Dokko et al., 2009).
Most of the literature so far has focused on the link between monetary policy and
the housing market and implicitly assumes that the responses of housing markets across
the regions or states are the same. This view basically follows the conventional wisdom
that monetary policy cannot be used to influence, control, or target the economic
conditions of particular regions. The reverse, however, is not necessarily true (Carlino
and Defina, 1999, Frantanton and Schuh, 2003). Regional economic conditions can
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significantly influence the aggregate response to monetary policy actions. This is mainly
due to the fact that the prevailing economic conditions vary across regions when
monetary policy actions are taken. In addition economic sensitivity to monetary policy
varies across regions (Carlino and Defina, 1999). Carlino and Defina (1999) provided
evidence on heterogeneous dynamic responses of real income to a monetary policy
tightening across U.S. states. They found that in some states, such as Indiana, Arizona,
and Michigan, income declines on average by 2%, whereas in other states, such as
Wyoming, New York and Texas, income declines only by about 0.5%. Both estimates
deviate significantly from the national average of 1.2%.
Similarly, the distributions of housing prices have been uneven across the U.S.
states and vary over time. In the last four-year period, i.e., 2005-2009, the real housing
price indexes decreased more than 10% per year in several states on both east and west
coasts, notably California, Florida, Nevada, and Massachusetts. However, during the
same period the housing prices have shown an increase of about 2% in states like
Wyoming, North Dakota, Washington, New Mexico and Tennessee. When we compared
the growth in housing prices in the last four years with the average growth since 2001, we
found that states like New York have grown more than three times the national average,
while other states, like Michigan, have declined to 31% less than the national average.
Thus, this heterogeneous distribution of housing price across the states and over time
could affect the response of the housing price to monetary policy shock.
From the perspective of the current debate, an important question is whether the
widespread, but not homogenous, housing bubble is caused by the monetary policy
shock, rather than caused by other regional or state-specific factors, known as a "local
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bubble" in the words of Chairman Greenspan. "Local bubbles" are local factors or
circumstances that are specific to each geographic market, whereas monetary policy is
the likely suspect of the "national" factor, which is the same across the nation (Frantanton
and Schuh, 2003). This paper, therefore, mainly examines the role of monetary policy
(national factor) on the housing bubble across the U.S. controlling for other local or statespecific factors.
Perhaps a similar study is found in Negro and Otrok (2007) who study the effects
of monetary policy on regions in the U.S. using quarterly state level data from 1986 to
2005. They use a dynamic factor model to distinguish the relative importance of the
common or national component in housing price movements from local or state-specific
shocks. They find that historical movement in house prices across the U.S. states were
mainly driven by the local component. However, the dramatic increase in house price
during the period 2001-2005 was different and more of a national phenomenon. This
paper differs from Negro and Otrok (2007) both in terms of methodology and focus.
First, this paper directly examines the effect of monetary policy on the regional housing
prices after controlling for state-specific factors.

Second, the paper uses a spatial

dynamic model which helps to control not only the regional heterogeneity, but also the
spatial heterogeneity or interdependence of housing prices across neighborhood states.
By controlling the three components—national, local and spatial—the paper provides
more reliable results.
Spatial autocorrelation is a phenomenon where values of a variable show a regular
pattern over space (Anselin, 1998). One reason house prices are spatially correlated is
that property values in the same neighborhood capitalize shared location amenities (Basu
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and Thibodeau, 1998). Housing markets in the same neighborhood might also be subject
to the same common externality, which is unmeasured (Wilhelmsson, 2002). Then,
ignoring spatial autocorrelation in analyzing the response of the housing market would
overstate or understate the effect of other factors, such as monetary policy, which is the
main variable of interest.
Using quarterly panel data on 49 contiguous U.S. states for the period 1976:Q1 to
2009:Q4, the paper shows how the change in the federal funds rate affects the growth in
housing price across the states. The results indicate that the housing bubble in the last
three decades was mainly driven by the local or state-specific factors, and the change in
monetary policy didn't have significant effect on the housing bubble across the states.
However, the recent housing boom was different in a sense that expansionary monetary
policy had contributed to the run-up in the housing price across the states. Specifically,
as the short-term interest rate fell by one percent, the housing prices were growing, on
average, by less than five percent across the states.
The remainder of the paper is constructed as follows. Section 4.2 briefly explains
the empirical methodology and the data used in the analysis. The empirical results from
both the dynamic spatial lag model and the dynamic spatial error model are presented in
Section 4.3. Finally, the conclusion of the paper is provided in Section 4.4.

4.2. Estimation Methodology and Data

The standard micro-housing model relates the market value of a property to a set
of characteristics that determine the property value.
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Recently the micro-housing

literature addressed the issue of correlation of housing prices across the neighboring
space (e.g., Basu and Thibodeau, 1998, and Cohen and Coughlin, 2008). On the other
hand, the macro-housing literature relates the housing market with the aggregate
economic activities (e.g. Taylor, 2007, Jarocinski and Smets, 2008, and Jan Dokko,
2009).
This paper is the middle way that uses a set of both the national and state level
macroeconomic characteristics that could affect the housing price. A standard housing
price model is specified following Case and Sheller (2003).

Personal income,

unemployment rate, mortgage rate and housing permits are the fundamental factors that
affect housing prices across the states (Case and Sheller, 2003, Kohn and Bryant, 2010).
The crime rate and the weather condition across the states could also have a significant
impact on housing prices across the states (Saiz, 2007, Capozza et al., 2002).
To exploit the existence of spatial correlation or interdependence of housing
prices among the neighborhood states, the paper uses a dynamic spatial model first
introduced by J. Paul Elhorst (2003). A dynamic spatial model can take two forms:
spatial lag dependence (known as spatial lag) and spatial error dependence, known as
spatial error model (Anselin, 1998). Spatial lag dependence refers to the assumption of
correlated errors that arise because of spatial spillover effects between observations of the
dependent variable. That means, for example, the housing price in New Jersey is highly
affected by the housing price in New York. Spatial error dependence refers to the
assumption of correlated errors as occur among the independent variables. It can also
arise from the spatial correlation between non-observable explanatory (or latent
variables) (LeSage, 1997) or omitted variables (whilemsson, 2002). Housing markets in
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the same neighborhood might also be subject to the same common externality, which is
unmeasured. That means there might be some unobservable factors that affect the
housing price both in New York and New Jersey.

To account for both types of

interdependence this paper models the housing price in the two forms, i.e., dynamic
spatial lag model and dynamic spatial error model.
A dynamic spatial lag model is specified as:
AlogH, =<|)AlogHt_1 + p W A l o g H t -t-^Ai^ +X t _!p + e t
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and His an N x 1 vector of house price for every U.S. state (s=l,...,N) in year t (t
=1,..,T). Wrepresent an Nx N spatial weighting matrix with zeros on the diagonal and
the element w represents the spatial correlation between the two spatial units i andj .
Then, p captures the overall strength of interdependence of housing price among the
neighboring states. <>| is the coefficient for the temporal lag that captures the
interdependence of the housing price over time, i, represents the federal funds rate used
as a monetary policy instrument and the main national factor and X captures the effect of
monetary policy on state level housing prices. X, is an Nx K matrix of K independent
variables that includes, the states or local factors that vary across the state (i.e.,
unemployment rate, real personal income, population, and crime rate), other national
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factors (30-year mortgage rate and inflation rate), and fixed state and period effects (i.e.,
state and year dummies), pis a vector of coefficients nd a,,is an N x 1 vector of
residuals.
The spatial weight matrix W, as given in equation 4.2, is a block diagonal matrix
defined for a single quarter. It is constructed using two alternatives. The first is a
distance contiguity weight matrix where the elements w measure the (standardized)
distance between the two states i and j . The second is a standardized binary contiguity
weights matrix, where the element w = 1 for states i and j that share a border, and
w = 0 for states that don't have a shared boarder. In either case, as is commonly done
in spatial econometrics research, I row-standardize the resulting matrix by dividing each
cell in a row by that row's sum.
A dynamic spatial error model is specified as follows:
A log H t = cbA log H t _i + A.Ait_! + X t _jp + e t

4.3

£ t = 8 W E , -+- n t

4.4

where u., is normally distributed with a zero mean and constant variance, and 8 is the
spatial error correlation coefficient which indicates the possible interdependence of an
observable factor that affects the housing price across the neighboring states. All other
notations are the same as in the spatial lag dependent model.
I estimated the models by maximum likelihood using MATLAB code written by
Paul Elhost (2005), and R.J. Franzese and J.C. Hayes (2006). The likelihood function for
the spatial-lag model involves only one complicating modification of the likelihood for
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the standard linear additive model. To see this, express the simple spatial-lag model in
vector form, with the stochastic component of the left-hand side as:
AlogH = pWAlogH + Xp + £=>s = ( I - p W ) A l o g H - X p = AAlogH-Xp

4.5

Then, the likelihood function for the stochastic component, «r, is the usual linear normal
likelihood:
NT

L(S) =

^ J

4.6

^[-^}

which in this case, will produce likelihood in terms of A log// as follows:
NT

L(s)=| A|| -±-

1 2 expf-^(AAlogH-Xp),(AAlogH-Xp

4.7

This resembles the typical linear normal likelihood, although the transformation from s
to A log// is not by the usual factor, 1, but by

| A | = | I — p W | . The maximum

likelihood is then calculated numerically (Elhorst, 2003).
The paper uses panel data for 49 contiguous U.S. states for the period 1976:Q1 to
2009:Q4. The housing price data for each state comes from the Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). OFHEO estimates and publishes quarterly
house price indexes (HPI) for single-family detached properties. OFHEO use the data on
conventional conforming mortgage transactions obtained from the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae). The real housing price index data are obtained by deflating the nominal
HPI using the core PCE inflation, which measures inflation in the personal consumption
expenditure basket, less food and energy.
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The state level per capita personal income, population, unemployment rate, and
housing permit data are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Census. The real per capita
personal income data are computed by deflating the nominal per capita income using
PCE inflation. Housing permit refers to the number of new, privately owned housing
units authorized by each state. The crime rates (i.e., murder rate and burglary rate, per
100,000 populations) are obtained from the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports Series. Data
on weather conditions (i.e., average January temperature and July mean relative
humidity) are obtained from the United States Department of Agriculture Economic
Research Service Natural Amenities Scale database.

The national or aggregate level

variables such as the Federal Funds rate, and inflation as measured by the GDP deflator
were taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis database (FRED). The 30-year
mortgage rate is obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Census. The distance between the
capital cities of the 49 contiguous U.S. states is obtained from the Regional Economic
Information System database.

4.5. Estimation Results

This section reports three sets of empirical results. The first set of results provides
evidence on the relative importance of national versus regional or state shocks in driving
house price movements across the U.S. states over the last three decades. The second
sets of results provide answers for the question of whether the prolonged expansionary
policy since 2001 was behind the housing boom in the period 2001-2007. These results
are obtained by using a standardized contiguity distance weights matrix.
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Table 4.1 presents estimation results using the entire sample 1976:Q1-2009:Q4.
The first two columns provide estimates of the spatial lag model (i.e., equation 4.1),
which includes a time-lag of the dependent variable to account for temporal dependence,
as with the standard dynamic panel model. State and year dummies are also included to
account for regional and period heterogeneity. The period dummies provide a flexible
way to model common trends and/or common (random) shocks in the housing market.
Another sort of spatially correlated domestic factor is captured by including a spatially
weighted dependent variable. Again, the estimated coefficient on the spatial lag gives an
estimate of the strength of interdependence in housing prices across the neighboring
states, assuming that a shock in housing price in one state would affect house price in
other closest neighboring states.
The first column of Table 4.1 reports the results in the case where only the
national factors are included in the regression. A spatial-lag coefficient is statistically
positive and significant, implying that an increase in neighbor state house price leads to
an immediate increase in a given state house price.

The sign ofp here provides

information about the sign of interdependence; however, the magnitude would change for
preferred specifications. The coefficient of the main national factor, i.e., the federal
funds rate, is negative and statically significant, indicating that the change in monetary
policy was one of the factors behind the historical movement in housing prices across
U.S. states.
In the next model (column 2 of Table 4.1), I control for a state-level
macroeconomic performance by adding real per capita income, unemployment rate,
population, murder rate, and housing permit. As in other markets, the demand and supply
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factors in each state could affect the housing price. The real per capita income, which is
heterogeneous across the states, could affect the affordability of households given the
level of mortgage interest rates (McCarthy and Peach, 2004). Thus, in the states where
the per capita income is relatively high, households bid up those prices simply because
they can afford them. The unemployment rate is also very heterogeneous across the
states, and thus its effect on the demand for housing would be different across the states.
In the U.S. states where unemployment is high, the housing price is expected to be
relatively low.

If so, I would expect a negative coefficient estimate for the

unemployment variable. The demand for housing is certainly affected by the number of
people residing in each state. The relatively more populated states would have more
demand for houses, and thus would be expected to have a positive effect on housing
prices. The crime rate is also very volatile across the region. It is expected to have a
relatively lower demand, and thus price, for housing for the states where the murder rate
is high. The number of housing permits by state governments would positively affect the
supply of housing (and thus the price of house) that is expected to vary across the states.
As reported in column 2 of Table 4.1, the significant effect of monetary policy
(shown in model 1 or column 1) disappears when the local or state level factors are
controlled. Among the state level factors the coefficients associated with real per capita
income and housing permit are insignificant. As expected, the unemployment rate and
murder rate had a negative and significant impact on housing prices across the U.S.
states. The coefficient of state level population turns out to be positive and significant as
expected.
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The last two columns of Table 4.1 presented estimates of spatial error model. As
of the spatial lag model, first I control only the national or macro-aggregate variables. As
indicated in the third column, the coefficient of change in the federal funds rate is found
to be negative and significant. However, as I control for more macroeconomic variables
that vary across the states, the coefficient of short-term interest rate turns out to be
insignificant, whereas the state-level variables such as unemployment rate, murder rate,
and population become significant.

The coefficient of the spatial-error is still positive

and significant, indicating that there are unobservable, spatially correlated factors that
affect the housing price across the neighboring space.
To understand whether the recent expansionary policy was behind the housing
boom in the period 2001-2007, both the spatial lag and spatial error model are reestimated for the two sub-sample periods 1976-2000 and 2001-2007. Evidenced from
the results reported in Table 4.2, the change in federal funds rate is insignificant across all
the four alternative estimations. This indicates that monetary policy didn't have any
significant effect on the ups and downs of housing prices across the U.S. states during the
period 1976-2000.
As indicated in Table 4.3, coefficients of the change in the federal funds rate are
negative and significant across all the four estimations, i.e., even after the introduction of
the regional variations. Specifically, as the short-term interest rate increases, the housing
prices increased across the U.S. states. Both spatial and temporal-lag coefficients in all
the four different specifications are significant, indicating that the housing price is not
only correlated over time but also across the neighboring space. That means, as housing
price increases, the housing price in the closest neighboring states increase as well.
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To summarize, the historical movement in housing prices across the U.S. states
were mainly driven by local or state-specific factors. However, the recent housing boom
in the period 2001-2007 was different. The expansionary monetary policy has a nonnegligible impact on housing prices across the U.S. states, but the impact was small
relative to the size of the housing boom. Moreover, the housing prices across the states
were highly spatially correlated and, thus, the results after controlling for the spatial
interdependent provide reliable results.

4.5. Conclusion

This paper examines the effect of the monetary policy shock on the housing
bubble across the U.S states, after controlling for both regional and spatial heterogeneity
across the neighboring states. I used a spatial dynamic model that helps to capture both
temporal and spatial interdependence in housing prices. Using quarterly data spanning
from 1976 - 2009, the historical bubbles in housing prices across the 49 contiguous U.S.
states were mainly driven by the state-specific factors. The important national factor, i.e.,
monetary policy, was not behind the movement in housing prices across the states.
However, in the recent period, i.e., 2001-2007, the expansionary monetary policy had a
significant impact on increasing housing prices across the states. Indeed, the state or
local factors had an important contribution in housing price in those (housing) boom
periods.
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Table 4.1
Estimation Results of Dynamic Spatial Model for the Period 1976 - 2009
Explanatory Variable

Spatial Lag Model
(a)
0.051**

Temporal lag(H t _j)

(b)

(a)
0.038**

0.130**

Spatial lag( W H , )

(b)
0.157**

0.115**

0.495**

0.441**

-0.041**

-0.033

0.109**

spatial error( W E , )
0.072

-0.081**

A Federal funds rate( 11_()

Spatial Error Model

log House permit at t — 1

1.637

0.981

log A Real per Capita Income at t — 1

0.057

0.008

-0.754**

-1.187**

0.029**

0.041**

-2.876**

-1.187**

Unemployment rate at t — 1
log Population at t — 1
log Murder rate at t — 1
constant
LR test
Observations

29.250**

11.440**

4.060

0.522

705.97

945.61

1373.78

1419.10

6468

6468

6468

6468

** (P<0.05)
The Spatial Lag Model is: A log H t = (|)A log H,_, + pAWA log H t + A.Ait_, + X,_jP + e,
The Spatial Error Model is: A l o g H , = pWAlog H , + A-Ai,^ + Xt_jP + s,,

£t = 5 W £ t + n t
where H is the growth of housing price calculated as the log difference (i.e. A log HPI). All
regressions include fixed period and unit effects; those coefficient estimates are suppressed to
conserve space. The weight matrix is W constructed using the distance between the capital
cities of each state. All the spatial weights matrices are row-standardized.
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Table 4.2
Estimation Results of Dynamic Spatial Model for the Period 1976 - 2000
Explanatory Variable
(a)

(b)

Temporal lag( H t _j)

0.008**

Spatial lag( W H , )

0.407**

0.448**

spatial error( W e , )
-0.094

(b)

(a)

0.001**

A Federal funds rate( l,_j)

Spatial Error Model

Spatial Lag Model

0.115

0.026**

0.035**

0.654**

0.609**

-0.037**

-0.072

log House permit at / - 1

2.375

1.075

log A Real per Capita Income at t — 1

0.002

0.015

-0.408**

-0.207**

0.011**

0.057**

Unemployment rate at t — 1
log Population at t — 1
log Murder rate at t — 1
constant
LR test
Observations

-0.691**

-0.233**

12.010**

17.350**

28.660

25.789

1555.04

1058.08

1579.07

1349.50

4900

4900

4900

4900

** (P<0.05)
The Spatial Lag Model is:
A log//, = ^Alogi/,_, + pMVA\ogH, + Xt±it_x +X,_lj3 + st
The Spatial Error Model is: A log//, = pJVAlogH, + AAit_x + X,_x/3 + st,
st = SfVet + /At
where H is the growth of housing price calculated as the log difference (i.e. A log
HPI). All regressions include fixed period and unit effects; those coefficient
estimates are suppressed to conserve space. The weight matrix is W constructed
using the distance between the capital cities of each state. All the spatial weights
matrices are row-standardized.
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Table 4.3
Estimation Results of Dynamic Spatial Model for the Period 2001 - 2007
Explanatory Variable

Temporal lag( H,_j)
Spatial lag( W H , )

Spatial '.Lag Model
(a)
0.587**
0.503**

(b)
0.499**

-0.043**

(a)
0.982**

(b)
0.861**

0.495**

spatial error( W s , )
A Federal funds rate(l,_,)

Spatial Error Model

-0.041**

0.643**

0.810**

-0.030**

-0.032**

0.835

0.221

-0.189

-0.107

Unemployment rate at t — 1
log Population at t -1

-0.641**

-0.279**

0.008**

0.001**

log Murder rate at / - 1
constant

-0.935**

-0.533**

log House permit at t — 1
logA Real per Capita Income at t — 1

LR test
Observations

2.999**

1.520
916.38

1108.68

1216.55

1616.97

1568

1568

1568

1568

** (P<0.05)
The Spatial Lag Model is:
AlogH, =(|)AlogHt_1 +pAWAlogH, +AAit_, + X H p + g,
The Spatial Error Model is:
AlogH, =pWAlogH, +AAit_! +Xt_l$ + et,

s t = 5 W e t + |~it
where H is the growth of housing price calculated as the log difference (i.e. A log
HPI). All regressions include fixed period and unit effects; those coefficient
estimates are suppressed to conserve space. The weight matrix is W constructed
using the distance between the capital cities of each state. All the spatial weights
matrices are row-standardized.
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